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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
DUBOIS V. PACKARD BELL CORP.: COMPLIANCE
WITH STATE PROCEDURES AS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO FEDERAL RELIEF
UNDER TITLE VII
In Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp.,1 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that a state employment commission's refusal to
process a charge of employment discrimination on the ground that the
charge was not filed in timely fashion with the state agency did not
constitute a "termination of [state] proceedings" within the meaning of
section 706(d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 and,
therefore, the complainant could not invoke the extended-limitations-
period for filing a grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
The plaintiff had resigned from the Albuquerque Job Corps Cen-
ter for Women, which was operated and controlled by Packard Bell
1. 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp.
July, 1972). The original statute, under which the principal case was decided
provided:
(d) A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed within
ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, except
that in the case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the
person aggrieved has followed the procedure set out in subsection (b) of this
section, such charge shall be filed by the person aggrieved within two hun-
dred and ten days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or
within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has
terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier,
and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State
or local agency. Id. (emphasis added).
The current amended version provides:
(e) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice
of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged un-
lawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against
whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of
an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved
has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings
with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed
by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings
under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge
shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency. 42 U.S.C.A.
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Corporation, and filed a charge of employment discrimination with the
EEOC 144 days later.3 Pursuant to section 706(b) of Title VII,' the
EEOC referred the charge to the appropriate state authority, the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission, which declined to process the com-
plaint on the ground that it was not filed in a timely manner.5 The
EEOC then asserted jurisdiction over the case0 and began conciliation
negotiations with Packard Bell. Following the failure of conciliation
attempts, the EEOC notified the plaintiff of her right to sue in federal
court.7 After plaintiff's initiation of federal judicial proceedings, the
§ 2000e-5(e) (Supp. July, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1970)
(emphasis added).
3. 470 F.2d at 974. Unlawful employment practices are defined in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5
(Supp. July, 1972). The exact nature of the discrimination alleged by the plaintiff in
Dubois is not disclosed in the opinion.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. July, 1972). Both provisions are identi-
cal, with the exception of the change in reference indicated:
(c) In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in
a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or
authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such prac-
tice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving
notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) [(a) in the origi-
nal version] of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that
such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days
during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If
any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a
State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and
signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceed-
ing shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this sub-
section at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropri-
ate State or local authority.
The development of EEOC procedure under the subsection is discussed in notes 34-39
infra and accompanying text.
5. 470 F.2d at 974. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-9(A) (Supp. 1971) provides:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice
• . may file with the commission a written complaint . . . . All complaints
must be filed with the commission within ninety (90) days after the alleged
act was committed.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the principal case, the period for filing a
charge with the EEOC in the absence of a state commission was also limited to ninety
days. See note 2 supra.
6. See notes 34-39 infra and accompanying text.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. July, 1972). Under the original statutory procedure,
which was applicable to the plaintiff in Dubois, the aggrieved party had to receive a
"suit letter" from the EEOC before proceeding into federal court. In this letter, the
EEOC notified the complainant that conciliation efforts had failed and that he could
bring suit within thirty days after receipt of the letter. Receipt of the letter has been
held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in federal court. See Cox v. United
States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
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district court granted Packard Bell's motion for summary judgment, 8
holding that failure to file a charge of unlawful discrimination with the
appropriate state agency within the ninety-day period prescribed by
New Mexico law precluded application of the extended federal filing
period provided in section 706(d).9 Noting that the case was one of
first impression, the Tenth Circuit relied primarily upon the legislative
history of Title VII in affirming the lower court's dismissal of the
case.
10
Title VII: The Procedural Matrix
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in an at-
tempt to eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin." In adopting the bill which was the
precursor of Title VII, the House sought to delegate "primary responsi-
bility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices" to
the EEOC, which was created by the measure.' 2 However, the House
bill, with its primary emphasis upon federal intervention in resolving
employment discrimination disputes, was substantially altered when the
Senate passed the Dirksen-Mansfield "leadership compromise" amend-
ments.' 3 One of the most significant changes effected by the Senate
amendments is embodied in section 706(b), which provides that state
The 1972 amendments have changed the statutory scheme. The EEOC now has
the power to bring a civil action against any respondent (except a governmental entity)
from whom it has been unable to secure voluntary compliance. In cases involving a
governmental entity, the charge must be referred to the Attorney-General, who then
may bring a civil suit. The aggrieved party has the right to intervene in any suit
brought by the EEOC or the Attorney-General. If the EEOC or the Attorney-General
fails to enter into a conciliation agreement or file a civil action within one hundred
and eighty days after the expiration of all applicable limitations periods, the EEOC
must so notify the aggrieved party, who then has the right to bring a civil action in
his own name within ninety days after receipt of the notice.
8. 470 F.2d at 974.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. 470 F.2d at 975.
11. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE, CoNG. & AnMw. NEws 2391, 2401.
12. Id. See also Additional Views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch,
Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon. William T. Cahill, Hon. Garner E. Schriver, Hon. Clark
MacGregor, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Hon. fames E. Bromwell, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMmi. NEws 2487, 2515.
13. Sen. Humphrey, one of the Senate leaders who introduced the Dirksen-Mans-
field amendments, remarked:
This is in the form of a substitute 'clean' bill that reflects 2 months of
Senate debate on the version of the bill that was passed by the House. 110
CONG. REC. 12707 (1964).
See Vass, Title V1: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IN. & COM. L. Rn-v. 431, 447
(1966).
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and local fair employment practice commissions will be granted a pe-
riod of at least sixty days to redress an employment discrimination
grievance before the EEOC asserts jurisdiction. 14  This provision was
deemed by its sponsors to be consistent with the preference indicated
in the proposed measure for voluntary settlement of discrimination
grievances at the local level;15 however, in somewhat anomalous fash-
ion, the measure as adopted cedes jurisdiction temporarily to the very
state agencies whose ineffectiveness prompted passage of the Act."0
Thus, under section 706(b) as enacted, if employment discrimination
has been practiced in a state or a political subdivision thereof which
has a law prohibiting such discrimination, the aggrieved party is re-
quired to file a charge with the appropriate state or local commission
before pursuing any federal remedies.17  Upon the expiration of sixty
days following the filing of the complainant's charge with the state
agency, the EEOC can then assert jurisdiction over the case.' 8 There-
14. See note 4 supra for the text of this subsection. In a memorandum prepared
by a staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, it is asserted that:
One of the principal changes made by the Senate was to preserve State sover-
eignty. A State can maintain exclusive jurisdiction over unfair employment
practices for a limited time if it has State or local laws prohibiting such
practices. 110 CONG. REc. 14331 (1964).
The Republican floor manager of the bill, Sen. Case, remarked that:
Clearly, under the mechanics of the bill in the form with which the leader-
ship is concerned, more concern or more deference could not be given to the
rights of the states. For example, the Federal agency which would be able
to mediate in this connection could not consider taking any action for 2
months, if there were any State machinery at all. The States will be given
that much time in which to deal with complaints. Only when the States
have no colorable claim to give consideration to such matters can they be
considered by the Federal Government in the time specified . . . . 110
CoNo. Rc. 13081 (1964).
15. Senator Humphrey expressed this philosophy before the Senate:
The major substantive changes give increased emphasis to the role of State
and local authorities and to methods of securing voluntary compliance. This
is both salutary and consistent with the basic philosophy of the bill-that,
whenever possible, the problem dealt with by the bill should be resolved
locally and voluntarily. 110 CONG. Ruc. 13088 (1964).
See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972); Cunningham v. Litton Indus.,
413 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1969); Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,
405 F.2d 645, 650-52 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Vigil v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 305 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Colo. 1969), affd, 455 F.2d
1222 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four
Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1969); Note, Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5
COLUM. J. LAW & SOCIAL PROB. 1, 17-19 (1969).
16. In the first year and a half of EEOC operations, only 34% of the 1,495 com-
plaints deferred to state agencies were actually processed by those agencies. Note,
supra note 15, at 17.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. Id.
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after, both state and federal commissions could proceed concurrently,
with the proviso that a final judgment or settlement in one proceeding
would terminate the other.' 9 With respect to timeliness requirements
in filing, an aggrieved party who pursued state remedies pursuant to
the procedure established by section 706(b) was required to file a
charge with the EEOC within the earlier of 210 days after the occur-
rence of the alleged discriminatory act, regardless of the status of state
proceedings, or thirty days after receipt of notice that the state pro-
ceedings had been "terminated. 20 In contrast, an aggrieved party in a
state without a remedial procedure for employment discrimination was
required to file charges with the EEOC within ninety days after the
alleged discriminatory act occurred. 21
In 1972, subsequent to the events which gave rise to the Dubois
case, Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Act. 2 Among the
changes effected by the 1972 amendments was a substantial expansion
of the applicable limitations period for filing a charge with the EEOC.
In the case of a complainant who is required to pursue state remedies,
the charge must be filed with the EEOC within the earlier of 300 days
after the discriminatory act occurred or thirty days after notice of the
termination of state proceedings. 23  A complainant who proceeds di-
rectly with the EEOC must file the charges within 180 days after the al-
leged discriminatory act. 24
In view of the procedural scheme of Title VII, the courts have
generally held that certain statutory requirements constitute jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to maintaining a suit in federal court.25 For exam-
19. Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 321 F. Supp. 830, 833 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972). The district court
opinion was based on the goal of conservation of administrative and judicial resources,
as well as principles of res judicata. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that
the settlement reached in the state proceeding was too vague to bind the plaintiff and
thereby precluded a federal remedy. See also Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 422 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. Id. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir.
1970), wherein the court notes:
There is nothing discriminatory about this result . . . . This is made clear by
the inclusion of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b), which manifests the im-
portance of local and private settlements by providing a different timetable
for filing a charge with EEOC if there is a state or local fair employment
practice committee. In short, some employees have local FECPs and some
do not, thereby receiving a 'difference' in treatment under the statute.
22. The 1972 amendments were apparently adopted after the facts occurred in
Dubois, since Judge Murrah's opinion does not mention the statutory changes.
23. See note 2 supra.
24. Id.
25. See note 7 supra for an additional example of procedural prerequisites.
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ple, consistent with the congressional policy supporting extra-judicial
settlement of discrimination charges, an aggrieved party is not permit-
ted to bypass the EEOC and proceed directly into federal court.20
Further, if a state has provided a procedure for the prosecution of em-
ployment discrimination complaints, the aggrieved party must avail
himself of this procedure for sixty days before seeking redress from the
EEOCar-even if the state-created remedies are unsuitable to the
party.28  Moreover, after receipt of notice from the EEOC of the right
to sue in federal court, the complainant is restricted to a period of
thirty days in which to file a complaint; indeed, failure to file suit in
timely fashion constitutes an absolute bar to maintaining an action un-
der Title V1.29
Judicial Construction: Liberal Interpretation of Remedial Legislation
Apart from those procedural requirements which are clearly
mandated by the statute, however, courts have generally ac-
corded a broad construction to the measure, including its procedural
provisions.3 0 Recognizing that procedural requirements imposed by
26. See Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968). See also
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1202-04 (1971). But see 110 CONG. Rac.
14188, 14191 (1964) (remarks of Seans. Humphrey and Javits) (expressing the view
that proceedings before the EEOC are not a condition precedent to an action in federal
court).
27. Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970),
vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971); EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1969); Electrical Workers Local 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 26,
at 1212-16.
28. In Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970),
vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971), the Ninth Circuit held that dismissal was proper where
the plaintiff had deliberately bypassed the Arizona Civil Rights Commission and filed
a charge with the EEOC. The Arizona CRC was empowered only to bring criminal
charges or seek conciliation. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief and argued that a
proceeding with the Arizona CRC would be an exercise in futility. The Ninth Circuit
held that the power to seek voluntary compliance is "relief" under § 706(b) and that
plaintiff's failure to follow the statutory procedure was fatal to his claim. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the
suggestions made in the Solicitor-General's amicus brief. The Court did not, however,
specify what those suggestions were. The Ninth Circuit's holding received implicit
approval in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII. See notes 2, 4 supra.
29. See Johnson v. 'IT-Thompson Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D.
Miss. 1971). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1209.
30. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972) ("tT]echnicalities
are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by
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section 706 are vague 1 and that "the average complainant is not ini-
tially represented by counsel, has no knowledge of the niceties of the
statute and generally makes his 'charge' in crude homemade fashion," 32
the courts have held many of the formal requirements of the statute to
be "'directory' rather that 'mandatory.' - For example, if a charge is
filed with the EEOC before being filed with the appropriate state
agency, the EEOC automatically forwards a copy to the state agency.
Upon termination of the state proceedings or the expiration of sixty
days, whichever is earlier, the EEOC will then assert jurisdiction over
the case without further action on the part of the complainant.3 4  With
respect to this administrative practice, the Tenth Circuit in Love v.
Pullman Co.3 5 held that the statute contemplated a second filing of
charges with the EEOC, rather than an automatic reassertion of juris-
diction by the Commission. However, a unanimous Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the EEOC's
existing procedure of automatic resumption of jurisdiction "complied
with the purpose . . . of § 706(d), to ensure expedition in the filing
and handling of those complaints,"3 6 and that a second filing require-
trained lawyers, initiate the process."); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d
888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) ("It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that
the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a
strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics."); Blue Bell Boots, Inc.
v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 should not be construed narrowly . . ... "); Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
305 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Surely
Congress did not intend to create a procedural morass, or a trap capable of capturing
even the wary traveler."); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D.
Ga. (1968)), ajf'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[C]ourts should not be overly
technical or strict as to form . . ").
31. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1969)
("IThe statute leaves much to be desired in clarity and precision . . . ."); Coleman,
supra note 15, at 2 ("Title VII has been termed somewhat less than a model of legal
draftsmanship. Nowhere is this indictment more deserved than in the sections dealing
with procedures preliminary to court enforcement.").
32. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ga. 1968), all'd,
412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. Thus, with only minor exceptions, the courts have adopted a permissive
attitude toward Title VIIs formal requirements, holding most of the limita-
tions expressed in the statute to be "directory" rather than "mandatory."
Consequently, the incidence of dismissals, non-suits and summary judgments
stemming from the failure of complainants or the Commission to comply
vith the Act's legal technicalities have sharply declined. Coleman, supra
note 15, at 29.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1971). See also Coleman, supra note 15, at 8-9; De-
velopments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1213.
35. 430 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion is criticized in Comment, A Look at Love v. Pullman Co., 37 U. CmI.
L. REV. 181 (1969); Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1212-16.
36. 404 U.S. at 526.
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ment would be a needless "procedural technicality," inappropriate to
the statutory scheme.17  In a subsequent case, Vigil v. American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co.,38 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged its pre-
vious error in Pullman and recognized that the EEOC may hold a com-
plaint in "suspended animation" pending the expiration of the sixty-day
period of exclusive state jurisdiction. 9
In Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., the Tenth Circuit distinguished
the Pullman and Vigil decisions by noting that in those cases the ap-
propriate state commissions had been given a "bona fide opportunity
to act upon the claims-an opportunity denied the New Mexico Com-
mission" in Dubois by the plaintiff's failure to meet the state statutory
deadline.40 The court stated that the legislative history of subsections
706(b) and (d) is so "manifestly clear as to remove all doubt" that
the sole purpose of those subsections is to insure that states will be
able to process employment discrimination cases before the plaintiff
resorts to federal remedies. 41 The court of appeals expressed concern
that a contrary holding "would enable a claimant to completely bypass
state proceedings in favor of federal proceedings by simply waiting un-
til the state is prevented . . . from considering the claim, and then
[utilize] the extended filing provisions of subsection (d)-a result
which flies in the face of the congressional intent. '42
In its attempt to effectuate congressional intent, the Tenth Circuit
clearly declined to give section 706(d) the "liberal interpretation
[usually] accorded remedial legislation . . . ,"4 notwithstanding the
fact that the court expressly recognized that prior decisions had treated
as "directory" those procedural requirements of Title VII which are not
clearly mandatory on the face of the statute.4 4  Several factors in the
37. Id. See note 30 supra.
38. 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972), afj'g 305 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1969).
39. Id. at 1224-25. The court held that the filing of a complaint with the EEOC,
which must then be referred over to a state or local agency, tolls the running of the
210-day limitations period for filing with the EEOC under § 706(d).
40. 470 F.2d at 975. See note 5 supra.
41. 470 F.2d at 975.
42. Id. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
43. 470 F.2d at 975.
44. See notes 30, 33 supra. See also Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887
(9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969);
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968), wherein three
courts of appeals rejected the contention that there is an overall time limitation of
180 days in § 706 (ninety days to file the charge, followed by sixty days for the EEOC
to conciliate and the thirty days to file a complaint in federal court after receipt of the
"suit letter"). These cases reflect a "broad" interpretation of a procedural technicality
which could have been inferred from § 706 without doing violence to the text of the
statute.
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instant case were undoubtedly influential in the court's decision to ad-
here strictly to statutory requirements. It is clear, as the court recog-
nized, that the plaintiff in Dubois was attempting to use the extended
filing period of section 706(d) to circumvent her failure to file the
charge of employment discrimination within either the state or federal
limitations period of ninety days. Further, the court was no doubt in-
fluenced by the strict construction given to the limitations periods in
state remedial legislation by the New Mexico Supreme Court.4 5  In-
deed, prevention of forum-shopping by achieving harmony between
the interpretations of state and federal provisions is a desirable result
of the Dubois decision. Limited solely to its facts, the court reached
a justifiable determination in the case.
However, Dubois is not expressly limited to its facts, and in light
of the recent amendments to Title VII extending the limitations period
for the filing of a complaint to 180 days after the alleged violation,"
the case has a disturbing potential for disruption of the entire federal
scheme for vindicating employment rights. It is conceivable that a
state legislature which is either hostile to the objectives of Title VIPI
or which simply fails to adopt a liberal period for filing a grievance
could enact a restricted limitations period which an aggrieved party
would be required to satisfy in order to seek redress in either state or
federal court. Indeed, if the precise factual situation in Dubois oc-
curred subsequent to the effective date of the 1972 amendments, the
court would be presented with the circumstance in which the federal
filing period was satisfied by the complainant, but the state's filing pe-
riod was not. Complete foreclosure of Title VII relief because of a
complainant's failure to abide by stringent state requirements seems
manifestly undesirable in light of the relative ineffectiveness of most
45. See Swallows v. City of Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 265, 266-67, 298 P.2d 945,
946-47 (1956), a workmen's compensation case, wherein the New Mexico Supreme
Court stated:
Where a statute grants a new remedy, and at the same time places a limi-
tation of time within which the person complaining must act, the limitation
is a limitation of the right as well as the remedy, and in the absence of
qualifying provisions or saving clauses, the party seeking to avail himself of
the remedy must bring himself strictly within the limitations . . . . If one
does not protect himself and his rights under the law as written it is his
misfortune, and this court should not by judicial legislation, for the purpose
of relieving that misfortune, write into the statute a provision that the legisla-
ture has not seen fit to enact.
46. See note 2 supta.
47. At the present time, only 33 states and the District of Columbia have pro-
cedures for the redress of employment discrimination. See Coleman, supra note 15,
at 8 n.29; Note, supra note 15, at 17. The major features of state fair employment
practice laws are set out in Purdy, Title VII. Relationship and Effect on State Action,
7 B.C. INn. & CoM. L. REv. 525, 527 (1966).
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existing state procedures.48 Thus, it is apparent that congressional
amendment of section 706(d) is needed to limit the holding in Dubois
to its facts. Such an amendmen4 9 would need to make clear that
failure to file a timely charge with a state agency operates as a bar to
federal relief only when the state's limitations period coincides with
or exceeds the federally prescribed period. Obviously, to the extent
that a federal limitations period operates effectively to preempt the
controlling state period with respect to the processing of claims in the
federal administrative system, the accommodation of state and federal
48. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1215:
Insistence on formalistic requirements is particularly indefensible in light of
the fact that the overall deferral scheme has little to recommend it. The
mandatory sixty day deferral period does not encourage state agencies to
enforce their anti-discrimination laws vigorously since the time period allowed
is too short to reach a resolution of the problem. As a theoretical matter
one might suppose that states would attempt to create strong remedies in
order to keep the complainant in the state system after the sixty day period
has elapsed. But as a practical matter, no trend in this direction seems to
have developed; at the end of the mandatory sixty days, most complainants
turn to the EEOC.
See also Note, supra note 15, at 18-19. Further, the present procedures are already
confusing enough without the addition of a myriad of state limitations periods. See
Comment, supra note 35, at 188:
Moo often the procedural hurdles standing between an aggrieved individual
and his potential remedy have the appearance of being designed to prevent
the individual from ever receiving any relief. Turned away from the EEOC
with instructions to see the state agency and then come back, many com-
plainants might well conclude that they were once more "being given the run-
around." Each additional procedural rule requiring further individual initia-
tive acts as a screen to filter out the doubtful and the discouraged.
See also note 30 supra. But cf. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal Sys-
tem: Proposals for a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1177
(1965).
49. The current version of § 706(e) is set forth in note 2 supra. Below is a pro-
posed version of that section designed to incorporate the changes suggested in the text:
(e) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unfair employment practice occurred and notice
of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged
unfair employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom
such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has
initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings
with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed
by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings
under State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charges
shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency; Provided
that: if a State or local agency refuses to assert jurisdiction over a charge
for the reason that the person aggrieved has failed to file a charge within a
limitations period provided by State or local law which is shorter than one
hundred and eighty days, such refusal of jurisdiction shall be a termination of
proceedings under State or local law for purposes of this subsection, and the
aggrieved person shall be entitled to file a charge with the Commission
within thirty days after receipt of notice from the State or local agency that
it has declined to assert jurisdiction over the charge (proposed changes in
italics).
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processes is disrupted. Nonetheless, the overall congressional attempt
to avoid emasculation of state procedures would seem to be satisfied
by the EEOC's refusal to assert jurisdiction over a claim filed within
the federally prescribed period until the appropriate state agency has,
for whatever reason, refused to continue processing the claim, up to
the statutorily prescribed period of sixty days. Enactment of such an
amendment would enable states to take initial jurisdiction of the griev-
ance, as contemplated by the Act,"0 but would prevent the frustration
of federal rights by the passage or continuation of a restricted state lim-
itations period-a result which the decision in Dubois makes possible.
50. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that a
plaintiff who fails to obtain relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may
still pursue a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The Supreme Court recently
indicated that a right of action against private individuals may exist under § 1981.
See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 41 U.S.L.W. 4311, 4314 (U.S.
Feb. 27, 1973).

